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ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACQUITTED CRIMES UNDER
RULE 404(b): WHY THE MAJORITY SHOULD ADOPT
THE MINORITY RULE
MIGUEL MANUEL DELAO
C AN IT ever be fair for prosecutors to try to convict defendants
with evidence of a prior crime of which the defendant was ac-
quitted? The concept of fairness is fundamental to the American crim-
inal justice system. As stated by Blackstone: "it is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."' To effectuate
this principle, the system provides defendants with nearly every safe-
guard necessary to prevent miscarriages of justice. 2 These safeguards
include requiring the government 3 to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt,4 and providing defendants with a pre-
sumption of innocence.'
The Federal Rules of Evidence also play an important role in pre-
serving these principles of fairness and justice. 6 For example, Rule
1. 4 W. BiACKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *358. Justice Brennan expressed a similar view when he
urged the legal profession to "remember that society's interest is equally that the innocent shall not
suffer and not alone that the guilty shall not escape." Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sport-
ing Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, 291.
2. See L. NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CO NSPIACY 25-28 (1973).
3. In the interest of uniformity, the term "government" is used throughout this Comment to
refer to the entity prosecuting the defendant, regardless of whether it is a state or federal prosecu-
tion.
4. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
5. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (presumption of innocence is not in the
constitution, but is a basic component of a fair trial under our system).
6. For example, under Rule 404(a)(1) the government may not offer evidence of the ac-
cused's bad character to prove action in conformity therewith unless the defendant has first offered
evidence of his or her good character. The rule provides that "[e]vidence of a person's character or
a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except: (1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same." FED. R. Evm. 404(a)(1). This rule originated at common
law. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
The federal rules provide other less obvious safeguards as well. For example, hearsay evidence is
not admissible under the former testimony exception unless the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding,
or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered.., had an opportu-
nity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination
[is not excluded by the hearsay rule].
FED. R. Eve. 804(b)(1).
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404(b)7 prohibits the introduction of evidence of other crimes' to
prove the defendant acted in conformity with his or her bad character,
although such evidence may be admissible for other purposes.9 Fair-
ness is further preserved through Rule 403 which allows courts to
eliminate evidence of other crimes if its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value.' 0
However, these rules do not distinguish between evidence of a prior
crime of which the defendant was acquitted (prior acquitted crime or
prior acquittal)," and evidence of a prior crime of which the defen-
dant was convicted. Although evidence offered in prior convictions
may be admissible if offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b),
it remains unsettled'2 whether prior acquittals, even when relevant,
should be admissible.
7. Rule 404(b) provides that:
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. Evw. 404(b). For an excellent discussion of the historical development of the rule prohibit-
ing the use of evidence of other crimes to establish guilt, see Comment, Uncharged Misconduct
Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MLAi L. REV.
947, 951-58 (1988).
8. Evidence of other crimes is also referred to as extrinsic offenses, collateral crimes evi-
dence, prior bad acts, and prior crimes.
9. McCormick has identified nine exceptions applicable to this discussion: (1) to complete the
story of the crime; (2) to prove plan, scheme, or conspiracy; (3) to prove the defendant's modus
operandi; (4) to show propensity for unusual sexual relations; (5) to disprove accident or mistake;
(6) to establish motive; (7) to establish opportunity; (8) to show malice, deliberation, or requisite
specific intent; and (9) to prove identity. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 558-64 (3d ed. 1984).
See infra notes 178-238 and accompanying text for a discussion of these exceptions. In practice, the
exceptions have become the rule, so "other crimes" evidence is almost always admitted. Note,
Evidentiary Use of Prior Acquitted Crimes: The "'Relative Burdens of Proof" Rationale, 64
WAsH. U.L.Q. 189, 197-98 (1986).
10. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
11. In this Comment, evidence concerning a prior crime of which the defendant was acquitted
will be referred to as a prior acquitted crime or a prior acquittal. Introducing a prior acquittal does
not refer to the introduction of certified court documents attesting to the fact the defendant was
acquitted. Rather, it refers to the introduction of testimony and other tangible evidence concerning
the prior crime.
12. The Supreme Court likely will resolve the conflict among the federal circuits in United
States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989). The questions
presented in Dowling are:
(1) Does either Due Process or Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment bar, in
federal criminal prosecution, introduction of evidence concerning prior unrelated crimi-
nal conduct for which defendant has been previously tried and acquitted?
(2) If so, did court of appeals erroneously use statutory harmless error standard rather
than more stringent standard required by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967),
after determining that such evidence had been erroneously admitted?
Dowling, 57 U.S.L.W. 3596 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1989). For a discussion of Dowling, see infra notes 197-
202 and accompanying text.
PRIOR ACQUITTED CRIMES
This Comment examines the different approaches taken by the
courts that have addressed the admissibility of prior acquittals. The
Comment contends that significant constitutional implications arise
when the evidence stems from a crime of which the defendant was
acquitted, 3 and concludes that evidence regarding settled factual is-
sues from an acquittal14 should be inadmissible in almost every cir-
cumstance.
I. APPROACHES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACQUITTED CRMES
Courts addressing the admissibility of prior acquittals have taken
three different approaches. The majority view treats prior acquittals
the same as prior convictions, performing a Rule 403 balancing test
and determining whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose
under Rule 404(b) before admitting the evidence. The minority view is
that a prior acquitted crime is inadmissible if the issue the government
seeks to prove was litigated in the prior trial and decided for the de-
fendant, even if the evidence otherwise meets the requirements of Rule
403 and Rule 404(b). The third approach, a modified version of the
minority view, was recently created by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit. Under this approach, the use of prior ac-
quitted crimes is prohibited only where the issue the government seeks
to prove through the prior acquittal was expressly considered and re-
jected by the prior jury.
A. The Majority View: Prior Acquitted Crimes Treated as Any
Other Evidence
The majority rule 5 is that a prior acquitted crime is admissible un-
der Rule 404(b) if it otherwise meets the requirements of the rule, a
13. This Comment concerns only cases where the defendant has been acquitted of the extrinsic
offense. Where the defendant was convicted or remains uncharged, or where a mistrial or nolle
prose was granted, the extrinsic offense is admissible under Rule 404(b). If the judge grants a
motion for a judgment of acquittal because no reasonable jury could convict the defendant, it
would have the same effect as an acquittal. If evidence of a prior crime is introduced against a
defendant on trial, which results in a conviction, and the defendant is subsequently acquitted of the
prior crime, no relief is available. Smith v. Wainwright, 568 F.2d 362, 364-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (con-
viction is not invalidated by a subsequent acquittal of the prior crime because juries sometimes
exercise the practical power of pardon).
14. Although it is impossible to know with absolute certainty the basis for a jury verdict,
courts have taken a common-sense approach to this question, drawing reasonable inferences from
the trial transcript. See infra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
15. Although the numerical disparity has narrowed, commentators have observed that the ma-
jority of jurisdictions follow this view. 2 J. WEiNsTEiN & M. BEROER, WEtNsTEm's EVMENCE
404[101, at 404-74 (1988); Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence is to Other Offense as Affected
by Defendant's Acquittal of that Offense, 25 A.L.R.4th 934, 939 (1983).
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proper Rule 403 balancing is conducted to prevent unfair prejudice to
the defendant,' 6 and the evidence is pertinent to a disputed issue in the
trial.' 7 The decision on admissibility is solely within the trial judge's
discretion,' although the judge must allow the defendant to inform
the jury of the acquittal. 9 Jurisdictions following the majority rule do
not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 20 as articulated in Ashe v.
Swenson, 2' to evidence of extrinsic offenses. 22 These jurisdictions view
the defendant's acquittal of the extrinsic offense as inconsequential to
admissibility under Rule 404(b). 23 The majority view has been adopted
16. See, e.g., United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.) (" 'the trial judge must
balance the evidence's probative value against the danger of undue prejudice' ") (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1981)), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1968) ("evidence of prior
crimes is admissible only if it is relevant to an issue of material fact in the case").
18. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1972) (" 'despite the
acquittal the matter of admission or rejection is and should be addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge' ") (quoting Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1966)), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). Even in circuits where the majority rule is followed, trial judges have
excluded the use of prior acquittals because of undue prejudice, and have been upheld by appellate
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 744 F.2d 76 (10th Cir. 1984).
19. Most courts have ruled that a jury must be informed of the defendant's acquittal of the
extrinsic offense. See, e.g., Phillips, 401 F.2d at 305 ("admitting the [extrinsic offense] evidence
without informing the jury of the acquittal, was clearly erroneous"); State v. Bernier, 491 A.2d
1000, 1005 (R.I. 1985) ("the better rule . . . [is] to allow evidence of the acquittal either by stipula-
tion, by the parties' testimony, or by an instruction from the trial [judge]").
20. The doctrine of collateral estoppel means that when an issue of ultimate fact is settled by a
valid final judgment, it may not be relitigated by the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Unlike res judicata, which bars a new trial arising from the
same facts, see J. FREEDEN rHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 615 (1985), collateral
estoppel does not foreclose all future litigation; collateral estoppel only prevents relitigation of is-
sues previously decided. See id. at 658.
Ultimate facts are those facts which must be proved to convict the defendant; they are the "sine
qua non" of the charge. People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 486, 508 N.E.2d 665, 670, 515
N.Y.S.2d 753, 759 (1987). These include, but are not limited to, the statutory elements of the
crime. Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are "[t]hose facts which are necessary for determina-
tion of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are
based." BLAcK's LAw DCTIONARY 500 (5th ed. 1979). For an excellent discussion of the distinction
between evidentiary and ultimate facts in prior acquittal cases, see Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d at 486, 508
N.E.2d at 670, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
21. 397 U.S. 436, 443-46 (1970). In Ashe, the Supreme Court interpreted the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause to include the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Thus, the double jeopardy
clause prohibits not only retrying a defendant for the same offense, but also prohibits relitigating
an ultimate fact in a subsequent trial when that fact was necessarily found for the defendant in the
earlier trial. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text for further discussion of Ashe.
22. See, e.g., State v. Fielders, 124 N.H. 310, 314, 470 A.2d 897, 900 (1983) ("We refuse to
expand the perimeters of. .. Ashe v. Swenson... to allow collateal estoppel to bar the relitiga-
tion of an 'ultimate' fact.., which.., is now only an 'evidentiary' fact .... ").
23. See, e.g., United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Evidence of
another crime, otherwise competent, is not necessarily rendered inadmissible by the fact that the
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in Alabama,2 4 Alaska, 25 Arkansas, 26 California, 27 Idaho, 28 Michigan, 29
Missouri, 0 Nebraska,3 New Hampshire,3 2 New Jersey,3 3 North Da-
kota,3 4 Ohio," Oregon,3 6 Washington, 37 and Wyoming. 8 As of this
writing, the Fourth,3 9 Eighth, 40 Ninth, 4' and Tenth 42 Circuits, and the
United States Court of Military Appeals, 43 continue to hold this view.
accused was acquitted of such charge."); United States v. Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d 336, 337 (9th
Cir. 1972) (no reason to limit a judge's discretion in admitting prior crimes under Rule 404(b)
'"simply because of the added factor of acquittal"') (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 370 F.2d
171, 173 (9th Cir. 1966)), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); People v. Griffin, 66 Cal. 2d 459, 464,
426 P.2d 507, 510, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967) (en banc) ("competent and otherwise admissible
evidence of another crime is not made inadmissible by reason of the defendant's acquittal of that
crime").
24. See Ex parte Bayne, 375 So. 2d 1239 (Ala. 1979) (implicitly recognizing admissibility of
prior acquittal while allowing defendant to inform jury of disposition).
25. Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 968 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Eu-
banks v. State, 516 P.2d 726, 729 (Alaska 1973). But cf. Piesik v. State, 572 P.2d 94, 98 n.21
(Alaska 1977) (court reserved ruling on whether collateral estoppel applies to evidentiary facts be-
cause issue was not appropriately raised).
26. Polk v. State, 252 Ark. 320, 323, 478 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1972).
27. People v. Beamon, 8 Cal. 3d 625, 632-33, 504 P.2d 905, 909-10, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685-
86 (1973) (en banc); People v. Griffin, 66 Cal. 2d 459, 465-67, 426 P.2d 507, 510-11, 58 Cal. Rptr.
107, 110-11 (1967) (en banc).
28. State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 123, 676 P.2d 31, 37 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220
(1984).
29. People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Oliphant v.
Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979).
30. State v. Cooksey, 499 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. 1973); State v. Millard, 242 S.W. 923, 926-27
(Mo. 1922).
31. Williams v. State, 118 Neb. 281, 283-84, 224 N.W. 286, 287 (1929); Koenigstein v. State,
101 Neb. 229, 233-35, 162 N.W. 879, 881-82 (1917).
32. State v. Sefton, 125 N.H. 533, 535-36, 485 A.2d 284, 285-86 (1984); State v. Fielders, 124
N.H. 310, 313-14, 470 A.2d 897, 899 (1983).
33. State v. Yormark, 117 N.J. Super. 315, 337, 284 A.2d 549, 560 (App. Div. 1971), vacated
in part on other grounds sub nom. State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972).
34. State v. Heaton, 56 N.D. 357, 367-70, 217 N.W. 531, 535-36 (1927).
35. Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917).
36. State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 296, 532 P.2d 9, 10 (1975).
37. State v. Russell, 62 Wash. 2d 635, 384 P.2d 334 (1963). See State v. Tarman, 27 Wash.
App. 645, 621 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1980) (following Russell). Contra State v. Peele, 75 Wash. 2d 28,
448 P.2d 923 (1968) (applying doctrine of collateral estoppel to admission of evidence about prior
criminal act).
38. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
39. United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837
(1983); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974).
But see United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1971) (appearing to accept the
applicability of collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal prosecutions).
40. United States v. Riley, 684 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111
(1983); King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979).
41. United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Castro-Castro,
464 F.2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
42. United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Adding-
ton, 471 F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972).
43. United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 8-9 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 95 (1987).
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One issue conspicuously absent from the admissibility rulings of
federal courts is the possible violation of double jeopardy. Unlike
jurisdictions which exclude prior acquittals, federal courts that follow
the majority rule have not wrestled with the constitutional issues pre-
sented by the admission of prior acquittals." These courts view Rule
404(b) as an inclusive rule,45 meaning that the lack of language exclud-
ing prior acquittals dictates their inclusion in most circumstances.
State courts which have considered the double jeopardy issue reject
the application of collateral estoppel as applied in Ashe.46 The Wyom-
ing and New Hampshire Supreme Courts, for example, have ruled
that an acquittal in the prior trial establishes only that the government
could not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.4 7 The prior acquittal
is therefore admissible because in the instant trial the standard 6'f
proof is lower since the issue is admissibility, not guilt.4 8 In federal
court the government need only introduce sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the extrinsic
offense.4 9 Some states require the government to prove the commis-
sion of the extrinsic offense with clear and convincing evidence. 0
B. The Minority View: Issues Decided for the Defendant by the
Prior Jury are Never Admissible
The Fifth Circuit was the first circuit to break with the majority
rule, extending the Ashe doctrine of collateral estoppel to the use of
prior crimes evidence. In Wingate v. Wainwright,5 Donald Wingate
was charged with robbing a store on July 9th, 1968. The government
introduced testimony from Joseph Hellman that his store was robbed
44. These courts do not even explain their reasons for rejecting challenges to the admission of
prior acquittals. Apparently as a concession to opponents of the majority view, the Seventh Circuit
held that judges must inform the jury of the acquittal to counterbalance the prejudicial impact of
this evidence. See United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1968).
45. United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d at 616.
46. See, e.g. State v. Fielders, 124 N.H. 310, 314, 470 A.2d 897, 900 (1983).
47. Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 247 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Fielders, 124
N.H. at 313, 470 A.2d at 899.
48. This view has been labeled the "relative burdens of proof" argument. Note, supra note 9,
at 200-01. See State v. Smith, 532 P.2d 9, 10 (Or. 1975) ("Acquittal establishes only that a jury did
not find the defendant to have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. To be admissible, however, evidence of other conduct need not be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (footnote omitted). For a critique of this argument, see infra notes 135-54 and
accompanying text.
49. Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988).
50. See, e.g., State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411, 412-13 (Tenn. 1981) ("it must be shown by
'clear and convincing evidence' that the prior crime was committed and that it was committed by
the defendant on trial").
51. 464 F.2d 209 (1972).
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by Wingate on December 11, 1967 and again on January 2, 1968.
James Angel testified that his store was robbed by Wingate on Decem-
ber 23, 1967.52 Wingate objected to this testimony on the ground that
he had been tried and acquitted of robbing Hellman and Angel. The
Fifth Circuit ruled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits
relitigating an ultimate fact from a prior proceeding, which resulted in
an acquittal, as an evidentiary or ultimate fact in a subsequent pro-
ceeding.53 The Wingate rule is thus: issues of ultimate fact, necessarily
decided by a prior jury for the defendant, cannot be relitigated by a
subsequent jury. 4
The District of Columbia," First,56 Second,5 7 Third, 8 Seventh,59 and
Eleventh 6° Circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit's lead. Several
52. Id. at 210.
53. For the definition of "evidentiary" and "ultimate" facts, see supra note 20. The court in
Wingate expressly rejected the claim that Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), should apply only
in cases where an ultimate fact from a prior acquittal is being used to prove an ultimate fact in the
instant trial. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 213. Some jurisdictions and commentators still hold that Ashe
only prohibits using ultimate facts in this manner, and that Ashe is therefore not a bar to the use of
prior acquitted crimes to establish evidentiary facts in the subsequent proceeding. See, e.g., United
States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1972) (under Ashe, collateral estoppel applies
only where an ultimate fact from the prior acquitted crime is "an essential element of the second
charge"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973); Note, Extension of Collateral Estoppel to Evidence
from a Prior Acquitted Crime, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1419, 1432 (1984) (under Ashe, collateral estop-
pel applies where an ultimate fact from the first proceeding is "being relitigated as [an] ultimate
factf in the second proceeding").
54. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 212.
55. See United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 869 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
56. United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 583-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
LaTorre v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 510 (1987); United States v. DeVincent, 632 F.2d 147, 154 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980).
One commentator has listed the First Circuit as following the majority rule. See Note, supra note
53, at 1425. The case cited by the commentator to support the categorization is Benson v. Superior
Court, 663 F.2d 355 (1st Cir. 1981). Note, supra note 53, at 1425 n.46. In Benson, Massachusetts
prosecuted Benson for conspiracy to commit arson. Benson previously had been acquitted of a
different arson charge arising out of the same facts. Benson sought to bar the government from
relitigating the facts and issues necessarily determined in his favor at the prior trial. The court ruled
that it was too early to step in and protect the defendant because "there [was] no way of knowing
how the state will try to marshal its evidence and what points it will try to prove." Benson, 663
F.2d at 360. This case does not support inclusion of the First Circuit in the majority view group.
First, it was not a prior acquittal arising out of a separate set of facts. This case was nearly identical
to Ashe. Second, the court never decided whether the prior acquitted crime could be admitted. In
fact, language in the opinion implies that the court agreed with the defendant that the issues in the
prior case could not be relitigated. See id. at 360 (recognizing that collateral estoppel can bar "reli-
tigation of specific facts and issues necessarily found in a defendant's favor at a previous trial")
(citations omitted).
57. United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979).
58. United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 120-22 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
1309 (1989); United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980).
59. United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1980).
60. United States v. Hogue, 812 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1987); Albert v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d
865 (1 1th Cir. 1984).
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states also accept the Fifth Circuit's holding, although not necessarily
its reasoning, 6' includin 2 Arizona6 3 Florida,64 Georgia, 65 Illinois, 66
Kentucky, 67 Minnesota,68 Montana, 69 Nevada, 0 New York,7 Tennes-
see,7 2 Texas, 73 and Virginia. 74 Although the Kansas Supreme Court's
holding in State v. Irons75 is consistent with the minority rule, lan-
guage in the court's opinion suggests that it will follow the Sixth Cir-
cuit's approach. 76
C. The Sixth Circuit's Modified Approach
The Sixth Circuit has adopted a "modified approach ' 77 which pro-
hibits the introduction of certain prior acquittals, but admits more
prior acquittals than the Wingate standard. In Oliphant v. Koehler,71
the Sixth Circuit ruled that to exclude a prior acquitted crime under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel; defendants must prove that the
same exact issue the government seeks to establish through the prior
acquittal is one the prior jury considered and decided in the defen-
61. The various rationales used by these jurisdictions to exclude prior acquittals are discussed
infra notes 81-154 and in accompanying text.
62. Although the reference to a prior acquittal was the basis of a reversal in State v. Kerwin,
133 Vt. 391, 394-95, 340 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1975), Vermont is not included in this list. It is unclear
from reading Kerwin whether prior acquittals are inadmissible in Vermont. The court's decision
could be based on the reference to a prior criminal act which was irrelevant to the instant charges,
and thus inadmissible under Vermont's version of Rule 404(b).
63. State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960).
64. State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977).
65. Moore v. State, 333 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 1985) (overruling Taylor v. State, 174 Ga. 52, 162
S.E. 504 (1931)).
66. People v. Grayson, 58 IlI. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994 (1975);
People v. Ulrich, 30 Ill. 2d 94, 195 N.E.2d 180 (1963).
67. Commonwealth v. Hillebrand, 536 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1976); Asher v. Commonwealth, 324
S.W.2d 824 (Ky. 1959).
68. State v. Burton, 281 N.W.2d 195 (Minn. 1979); State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307
(Minn. 1979).
69. State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 P. 1106 (1923).
70. McMichael v. State, 98 Nev. 1, 638 P.2d 402 (1982).
71. People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987); People v.
Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1987).
72. State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981).
73. Dedrick v. State, 623 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Stuart v. State, 561 S.W.2d 181
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978); McDowell v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 530, 155 S.W.2d 377 (Crim. App.
1941).
74. Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 419, 258 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1979).
75. 230 Kan. 138, 630 P.2d 1116 (1981).
76. Id. at 142, 630 P.2d at 1120. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's approach, see infra
notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
77. Note, supra note 53, at 1439.
78. 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979).
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dant's favor. 79 When the government uses the prior acquittal to prove
a different issue, the evidence is admissible.
The key difference between the Sixth Circuit's modified approach
and the minority view is that the modified approach requires that the
prior jury have expressly considered the issue the government now
seeks to prove before a prior acquittal can be ruled inadmissible.
While the minority view focuses on the facts litigated before the prior
jury, the modified approach focuses on the issue the government seeks
to prove through the prior litigated facts. For example, if the govern-
ment seeks to introduce a prior acquittal to show a scheme or plan,
the modified approach will exclude the prior acquittal only if the prior
jury explicitly found that the defendant had no such scheme or plan. 80
Thus, even though the prior jury found the defendant not guilty of
the crime charged, the Sixth Circuit's approach allows the government
to present the prior acquittal to a subsequent jury to show a scheme or
plan to commit the instant crime.
II. PRIOR ACQUITTED CRIMES SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY
THAN PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNDER RULE 404(b)
The majority view treats prior acquitted crimes as it would any
other extrinsic offense. However, federal and state courts have articu-
lated a number of reasons for not admitting prior acquitted crimes
under Rule 404(b). These courts have based their objections on the
double jeopardy clause, due process (fundamental fairness) grounds,
and the federal rules' strict demand for relevant evidence that is not
unduly prejudicial.
A. The Use of Prior Acquitted Crimes to Demonstrate Guilt in the
Instant Offense Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
In Ashe v. Swenson,8 the Supreme Court combined two
established theories of law to help expand double jeopardy protec-
tions: the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause82 and the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.83 Collateral estoppel had not previously been
79. Id. at 555. See also United States v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1983) (reaffirming
the Oliphant approach).
80. See Oliphant, 594 F.2d at 555.
81. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
82. "No person shall... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause is applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
83. Collateral estoppel was first developed in civil litigation and has been applied in criminal
cases since United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
1989] 1041
1042 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:1033
applied to the states because the Court did not consider it a constitu-
tional requirement. In Ashe, the Court established collateral estoppel
as a constitutional requirement imposed by the double jeopardy
clause, noting that "whatever else that constitutional guarantee may
embrace, it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having
to 'run the gantlet' a second time." 8 4 In Ashe, the defendant was ac-
quitted of robbing one participant in a six-player poker game, but was
subsequently convicted of robbing a second player at the same poker
game. The defendant argued that the principles of collateral estoppel
contained within the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment
prohibited the second conviction. The Court agreed, observing that
although Missouri could have charged the defendant with six separate
offenses and imposed six punishments upon conviction, once a jury
determined that the defendant was not one of the robbers, the state
could not relitigate that issue before a new jury.85 The Court found
Missouri's actions to be the equivalent of retrying the defendant, al-
beit with a different victim. 8 6
Based on Ashe, admitting evidence of a defendant's prior acquitted
crime violates the principles embodied in the double jeopardy clause.
Ashe stands for the proposition that issues necessarily decided for a
defendant in a prior proceeding cannot be relitigated. Introducing the
prior acquitted crime allows, if not encourages,8 7 the jury to retry the
defendant. 8 Defendants are thus forced to reestablish their innocence
because juries often view evidence of a prior offense as proof of guilt
in the instant offense. 9 Such a result strikes at the foundation of the
double jeopardy clause.90
84. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 446.
86. Id.
87. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
88. "[T]he government is given a second chance to prove something it had previously been
unable, in a trial, to demonstrate." United States v. Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d 336, 339 n.3 (9th Cir.
1972) (Ely, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973). Aside from the obvious relitigation
which occurs in open court, the jurors inevitably relitigate the prior crime in their own minds.
Note, Impeachment of the Criminal Defendant by Prior Acquittals-Beyond the Bounds of Rea-
son, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 561, 584 (1981).
89. State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307, 350 P.2d 756, 764 (1960).
90. The Supreme Court has explained the policy underlying the double jeopardy clause as
follows:
'[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to em-
barrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.'
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-
88 (1957)).
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Relying on Ashe, several jurisdictions have held the admission of
prior acquitted crimes to be double jeopardy violations. In United
States v. Mespoulede,91 the defendant was charged with possession of
cocaine on January 31, and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The jury
acquitted the defendant of possession, but was unable to reach a ver-
dict on the conspiracy count. At a second trial on the sole charge of
conspiracy, government witnesses testified that the defendant had pos-
sessed cocaine on January 31, and the jury convicted him on the con-
spiracy charge. 92 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded admitting the
evidence of the defendant's cocaine possession on January 31.93 The
court reasoned that the defendant's conviction was due largely to the
jury's belief that he had possessed cocaine on January 31.94 Thus, al-
though the defendant was previously acquitted of cocaine possession
on January 31, he was compelled to prove once again that he did not
possess cocaine on January 31 in violation of the double jeopardy
clause. 95
Although Mespoulede involved a retrial arising from the same set of
facts (but different charges), the rationale is equally applicable to
cases involving separate transactions. For example, in Blackburn v.
Cross,9 the defendant was charged with breaking and entering and
sexual assault. The victim had only seen the profile and back of her
assailant. 97 At trial, the government presented the testimony of an-
other resident in the victim's apartment complex, who claimed that
the defendant once broke into her apartment and sexually assaulted
her. 98 Although the defendant had been acquitted of assaulting the
other resident, 99 the trial court admitted her testimony as "evidence of
a similar offense tending to establish the identity of the [defendant] as
[the victim's] assailant."'° The Fifth Circuit held that admitting the
prior acquittal violated the double jeopardy clause and reversed the
defendant's conviction. 01 As in Mespoulede, admitting the testimony
forced the defendant to again prove he did not enter the other resi-
91. 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979).
92. Id. at 332.
93. Id. at 332-35.
94. Id. at 335.
95. Id.
96. 510F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975).




101. Id. The Court in Blackburn relied on Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
1972).
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dent's apartment and rape her.'0 2 Whether the prior crime arose from
the same set of facts or not is irrelevant: the double jeopardy violation
is identical. 103
Some courts have held that Ashe applies only to subsequent prose-
cutions based on the same transaction or set of facts, and only when
the government is attempting to prove an ultimate fact in the instant
trial which the prior jury rejected as an ultimate fact.'04 These courts
are incorrect. "[N]either the language of the courts in applying the
doctrine of collateral estoppel nor a common sense consideration of
the purposes of the double jeopardy clause support this position."'' 5
The doctrine of collateral estoppel embodied in the double jeopardy
clause bars all litigated ultimate facts from being relitigated in a subse-
quent trial, regardless of whether these facts serve as evidentiary or
ultimate facts in the subsequent trial.1°6 The violation of the double
jeopardy clause is in no way lessened by the use of the prior acquitted
crime in an evidentiary rather than in an ultimate fact capacity. 107
B. Forcing a Defendant to Defend Against a Charge of Which the
Defendant was Previously Acquitted Violates Fundamental Fairness
Courts need not accept Wingate's double jeopardy analysis to con-
clude that admitting prior acquittals violates a defendant's constitu-
tional rights. In State v. Perkins,0 8 the Supreme Court of Florida held
102. By admitting in closing argument that although the victim's identification was not the
best, but that it was "nailed down" when combined with the other resident's testimony, the prose-
cutor ensured that the defendant would have to reestablish his innocence to the other charge.
Blackburn, 510 F.2d at 1019 n.4.
103. This has been the view of the courts which have ruled that collateral estoppel bars prior
acquittals from being introduced under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., Wingate, 464 F.2d at 213-14; Albert
v. Montgomery, 732 F.2d 865 (1lth Cir. 1984); United States v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.
1983); United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973); Note, supra note 9, at 196-97.
105. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 213 (commenting on the trial court's approach).
106. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the Court held that if "a[n] issue of ultimate
fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443.
107. The Fifth Circuit observed:
We do not perceive any meaningful difference in the quality of "jeopardy" to which the
defendant is again subjected when the state attempts to prove his guilt by relitigating a
settled fact issue which depends upon whether the relitigated issue is one of "ultimate"
fact or merely an "evidentiary" fact in the second prosecution. In both instances the
state is attempting to prove the defendant guilty of an offense other than the one of
which he was acquitted. In both instances the rditigated proof is offered to prove some
element of the second offense. In both instances the defendant is forced to defend again
against charges or factual allegations which he overcame in the earlier trial.
Wingate, 464 F.2d at 213-14.
108. 349 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1977).
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that prior acquitted crimes are always inadmissible on fundamental
fairness grounds, while expressly rejecting the defendant's double
jeopardy claim.'09 The court in Perkins based its fundamental fairness
ruling on the holding in Wingate, where the Fifth Circuit found that:
[i]t is fundamentally unfair and totally incongruous with our basic
concepts of justice to permit the sovereign to offer proof that a
defendant committed a specific crime which a jury of that sovereign
has concluded he did not commit. Otherwise a person could never
remove himself from the blight and suspicious aura which surround
an accusation that he is guilty of a specific crime. Wingate was
charged with robbing Hellman and Angel and as a result of those
charges he endured the perils of trial. He was acquitted of those very
charges and that should end the matter. 110
The validity of Florida's position is demonstrated by comparing
Perkins to Loper v. Beto,"' a United States Supreme Court funda-
mental fairness decision." 2 In Loper, the Court ruled that a state may
not use prior uncounseled convictions for the limited purpose of im-
peaching a defendant." 3 If this use of prior convictions is fundamen-
tally unfair, using a prior acquitted crime to prove an element of
another crime is grossly unfair." 4 Since the defendant in Loper was
convicted of the prior charge, the majority rule's admission of prior
acquitted crimes is exponentially more prejudicial.
Another source of unfairness stems from prosecutorial zealousness.
In Ashe v. Swenson,"5 the Court noted that the government improved
its strategy at the second trial by not calling a witness whose identifi-
cation testimony was "conspicuously negative" during the first trial,
and that the witnesses who did testify again were much surer of their
identification. It is repugnant to the principles symbolized by the dou-
109. Id. Although dismissing the theory, the court's rhetoric supports the view that admitting
prior acquittals violates the double jeopardy clause. For example, the court explained that allowing
such evidence violated fundamental fairness because "to the extent that evidence of the acquitted
crime tends to prove that it was indeed committed, the defendant is forced to reestablish a defense
against it." Perkins, 349 So. 2d at 163. Though the words are different, this is the principle embod-
ied in the double jeopardy clause.
110. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 215, quoted in Perkins, 349 So. 2d at 163.
111. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
112. The Minnesota Supreme Court also has found that the admissibility of prior acquittals
violates fundamental fairness. In State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979), the court held
that once a defendant has been tried and acquitted, he is innocent and "in the interest of fairness
and finality... [should] no more [have] to answer for his alleged crime." Id. at 308.
113. Loper, 405 U.S. at 483.
114. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 335 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979).
115. 397 U.S. 436, 440 (1970).
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ble jeopardy clause to allow a prosecutor to perfect the government's
case against a defendant and retry the matter under the guise of other
crimes evidence. 116
C. The Relevancy of Prior Acquitted Crimes is Always Outweighed
by the Prejudice They Engender
Juries give prior convictions immense weight, and the prejudice en-
gendered by revelations of past criminal conduct is nearly insurmount-
able. 1 7 "[Ain obvious truth is that once prior convictions are
introduced the trial is, for all practical purposes, completed and the
guilty outcome follows as a mere formality. This is true regardless of
the care and caution employed by the court in instructing the jury."" 8
The method of introducing prior acquitted crimes heightens the pre-
judicial impact an acquitted crime would otherwise carry. The jury is
not informed of the defendant's prior charge through certified court
documents. Instead, the prosecution subpoenas the alleged prior vic-
tim. The jury thus sees two victims pointing accusatory fingers at the
defendant, although one jury has already determined that one finger
points unjustly." 9 The adage "where there's smoke there's fire" be-
116. As stated by the New York Court of Appeals, "where the People have had a full and fair
opportunity to contest issues, but have failed, it would be inequitable and harassive to again permit
the prosecution to establish these same matters, as if the first trial had never taken place." People
v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 508 N.E.2d 665, 670, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 758 (1987) (citation
omitted).
Repugnant or not, however, it is not a rare occurrence. See, e.g., United States v. Mespoulede,
597 F.2d at 332 (government's presentation of witnesses changed at a subsequent trial "doubtless
because Amy Bonk had proved less than a wholly convincing witness" at the previous trial); Win-
gate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 214 n.5 (5th Cir. 1972) ("the transcript of the testimony tending
to establish Wingate's guilt of other crimes is more than twice as long as the transcript of testimony
tending to establish his guilt of the crime charged").
117. Even though (1) the introduction of prior records is limited solely to impeaching the credi-
bility of the defendant, (2) the judge admonishes the jury not to consider the defendant's prior
record as proof of guilt in the instant case, and (3) the prior conviction is sanitized (that is, the jury
is not told the details of the prior conviction), juries still consider the defendant's prior record in
determining guilt. Allen, When Jurors are Ordered to Ignore Testimony, They Ignore the Order,
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1988, § 2, at 33, col. 2 ("They do the rational thing instead of the just
thing."). As the D.C. Circuit noted, "[tlo tell a jury to ignore the defendant's prior convictions in
determining whether he or she committed the offense being tried is... well beyond mortal capaci-
ties." United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
There is, admittedly, a difference between a certified prior conviction and testimony about a
prior crime of which the jury knows the defendant was acquitted. However, the net result is nearly
identical. See infra note 121.
118. United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir. 1972).
119. The prosecutor may join this chorus of accusers and rely on proof of the prior crime as a
substitute for lack of evidence in the instant crime. See Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 214
n.5 (5th Cir. 1972) (prosecutor spent more time proving extrinsic offenses than proving instant
crime).
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gins taking a mental foothold in the collective psyche of the jury. 20 If
the defendant cannot again disprove the prior crime, the jury is very
likely to return a guilty verdict.' 2' This is particularly true where the
defendant was acquitted of the prior crime because "the jury may feel
that the defendant should be punished for [that] prior activity even if
he is not guilty of the offense charged.' ' ' 22 Admittedly, however, this
is not sufficient reason to exclude evidence of prior acquitted crimes
since most government evidence is prejudicial. The precise question is
whether prior acquitted crimes can be relevant.
Under Rule 404(b), other crimes evidence is admissible only if it
proves something other than the defendant's bad character, such as
plan, intent, motive, or identity. And, as with all other evidence, such
evidence is admissible only if it also passes the relevance test under
Rule 402.123 Relevance depends upon two factors: materiality and pro-
bative value. 24 That prior crimes are material to the instant crime is a
given, else they would be inadmissible under the provision of Rule
404(b). It is also true that prior crimes are usually probative of the
proposition they are offered to prove. Wigmore pointed out that the
problem with evidence of extrinsic offenses, of which the defendant
was convicted, is not a lack of relevance, but rather too much rele-
vance. 25 However, the probative value of an extrinsic offense is di-
120. Lawyer Gerry Spence has pointed out that even before an extrinsic offense is introduced,
the defendant is already prejudged guilty:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of the citizen are just so much sloganeering for the politi-
cians on the Fourth of July. If the prosecutor charges you with a crime, you're guilty
already. We believe in each other's guilt, not in our innocence-none of us are inno-
cent .... [Als soon as the prosecution charges us it is not that we are presumed inno-
cent under the Constitution. It is that we have been caught, finally.
G. SPENCE, GuNNING FOR JusTicE 429 (1982).
121. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1979) ("criminal sanctions
.realistically, may be imposed in large part because the second jury is persuaded that [the defen-
dant committed the prior act]"); State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1977) (noting that the
defendant must defend against the prior charge because of "the prejudicial effect the evidence of
the acquitted crime will have in the minds of the jury in deciding whether he committed the crime
being tried"); State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979) ("[t]here is too great a chance
that the jury will punish for past crimes even if uncertain about present ones").
122. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979).
123. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R.
Evm. 402.
124. McCoRxacK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541 (3d ed. 1984).
125. IA J. WsmuoRE, EVIDENCE § 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983) ("It may also be said that it
is because of the indubitable relevancy of specific bad acts showing character of the accused that
such evidence is excluded. It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but
because it has too much.").
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minished when the defendant is acquitted because its probative value
often depends on the defendant's guilt of the prior crime. 126 "If the
[other crimes] evidence is false, it cannot support the inference for
which it is offered.' '1 27
The concept that "mere charges, accusation, and arrest are consis-
tent with innocence"' 12 undermines the logic of courts which argue
that even though the defendant was acquitted of the prior crime, the
prior acquittal's relevance is overwhelming. 129 Their position is akin to
former Attorney General Meese's cynical proclamation that police of-
ficers arrest only the guilty. 13 Such a premise should be rejected be-
cause "it is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that . . . [iun the eyes of
the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent.' '1 31
Because the relevance of an extrinsic offense is often fatally under-
mined by an acquittal of that offense, prior acquitted crimes should
almost always be excluded under Rule 403.132 However, even if a court
finds that the prior acquittal has some limited relevance, the relevance
must be substantial to outweigh the prejudice which other crimes evi-
126. Specific examples of how extrinsic offenses lose their relevance when the defendant is ac-
quitted are discussed infra notes 178-238 and in accompanying text.
127. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence: A Sliding
Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE D ma L. REv. 556, 564-65 (1984). This is implicitly obvious. "In the
Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor." Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
1496, 1501 (1988) (citation omitted). A second jury should not be allowed to overrule the first
jury's acquittal by concluding that the defendant was the actor. See United States v. Dowling, 855
F.2d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989); Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674,
677, 333 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1985).
128. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 730 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Gabrielson v. State, 510 P.2d
534, 536 (Wyo. 1973)).
129. See, e.g. United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1049 (1976). In Moore, the court admitted that the prior acquittal may be prejudicial, but it upheld
the trial judge's decision because the prior acquittal was probative of the issue of knowledge and
intent. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to steal from a naval installation. At trial, some
testimony implicated the defendant in a separate conspiracy to steal from another naval installa-
tion, a charge of which the defendant had been acquitted. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the prior acquittal demonstrated that the defendant "acted with knowledge and intent." Id. at
1079. In other words, the defendant's alleged participation in the prior conspiracy demonstrated
that he was actively involved in the instant conspiracy and was not an innocent bystander. The
court is correct in its relevance analysis only if the defendant committed the prior theft. Since the
court did not inquire into the prior jury's findings, however, it is unclear whether the prior jury
determined that the defendant did not participate in the earlier conspiracy. Thus, the relevance of
the prior acquittal is unclear.
130. See Dorsen, Should Ed Meese Resign?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 38, 39.
131. State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979).
132. See State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307, 350 P.2d 756, 763 (1960) ("The fact of an acquittal,
we feel, when added to the tendency of such evidence to prove the defendant's bad character and
criminal propensities, lowers the scale to the side of inadmissibility of such evidence.").
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dence carries.'33 Moreover, in light of the prejudicial impact of such
evidence, prosecutors may have a duty to avoid using prior acquit-
tals. 134
D. "Relative Burdens of Proof" Rationale Does Not Justify the
Admissibility of Prior Acquitted Crimes
A popular argument made by opponents of Wingate and supporters
of the majority rule is the "relative burdens of proof" rationale.'35
The argument rests on the claim that an acquittal does not establish
innocence; it proves only that the government could not meet its bur-
den beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, since the government need only
present evidence from which a jury could find by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant committed a prior crime for this evi-
dence to be admissible under Rule 404(b), 36 the government's earlier
failure to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not pre-
clude admission of the evidence.
Advocates of this position claim that the Supreme Court has ap-
proved their argument in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fire-
arms. 137 In 89 Firearms, the government instituted forfeiture
proceedings against the defendant, charging him with possessing fire-
arms for use in an unlicensed firearms business. The defendant had
been previously acquitted of knowingly engaging in the business of
dealing in firearms without a license, and argued that the acquittal
estopped the government from bringing the forfeiture action. The
Court disagreed, holding that the acquittal "merely proves the exis-
tence of a reasonable doubt as to [the defendant's] guilt."' 3 8 Because
the government only had to prove its forfeiture claims by a prepon-
derance standard, the Court ruled "that the difference in the relative
133. United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1968). The Tennessee Supreme Court
in State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), found that even if the extrinsic offense can be
proved, the defendant's acquittal of that crime makes it impossible for the government to meet its
burden of proving the prior crime with clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 413. Of course, this
argument is inapplicable in federal court since the government need only present "sufficient evi-
dence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act." Huddleston
v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1499 (1988).
134. "Prosecutors should content themselves with presenting competent, relevant evidence and
refrain from overkill, which as in the present case, prejudices a defendant's right to a fair trial."
Wingate v. State, 232 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (Pearson, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 994 (1971), quoted in Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 211 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1972).
135. This Comment rebuts the formulation of the relative burdens of proof rationale as pre-
sented in Note, supra note 9, at 199-200.
136. Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1501 (1988).
137. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
138. Id. at 361.
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burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precludes the appli-
cation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." 39
Opponents of Wingate view 89 Firearms as Wingate's death knell.
140
First, they read 89 Firearms as rebutting Wingate's holding that col-
lateral estoppel applies to the use of evidence in a subsequent trial
regardless of whether it operates in an evidentiary or ultimate fact ca-
pacity. At a minimum, opponents claim, 89 Firearms means that col-
lateral estoppel applies only when the prior acquittal is intended to
establish an ultimate fact in the subsequent prosecution. 4' Second,
they read the 89 Firearms decision as establishing the general rule that
if the standard for proving the disputed issue is lower in the subse-
quent proceeding than the standard applied in the earlier prosecution,
collateral estoppel will not bar the admissibility of a prior acquittal.
142
If its opponents are to be believed, Wingate and its progeny have been
slain. Reports of Wingate's death, however, "are greatly exagger-
ated." 143
There are fundamental flaws in the relative burdens of proof argu-
ment. Its most basic flaw results from a semantic approach to defen-
dants' rights. Note how the claim that admitting prior acquittals
results in a retrial of the defendant's guilt is rebutted: "[The]
[elvidence [of the prior acquitted crime] was not introduced for the
purpose of retrying [the defendant] on the charge for which he had
been acquitted."' 1" This argument misses the point. The introduction
of prior acquittals results in retrying the defendant for the earlier
crime, regardless of the purpose for which the prior acquittal is intro-
duced. 45 Opponents of Wingate claim that acquittals do not establish
innocence. However, our judicial system treats an acquittal as a ver-
dict of innocence. ' Although the relative burdens of proof rationale
139. Id. at 362.
140. See Note, supra note 9, at 194-95, 200.
141. See id. at 200.
142. See id.
143. Cable from Mark Twain to the Associated Press (1897), reprinted in J. BAR ET, FAm.-
iAR QUOTATIONS 625 (15th ed. 1980).
144. Note, supra note 9, at 198 n.47 (quoting United States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954, 957
(10th Cir. 1979)).
145. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
146. Although the evidence that a defendant committed the prior crime may sometimes pass
the clear and convincing test,
it is a basic tenet of our jurisprudence that once the state has mustered its evidence
against a defendant and failed, the matter is done. In the eyes of the law the acquitted
defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the interests of fairness and finality made
no more to answer for his alleged crime.
Carey v. State, 715 P.2d 244, 251 (Wyo.) (Rose, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting State
v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
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rests on technically logical reasoning, the analysis ignores human na-
ture and concepts of justice.
Moreover, since 89 Firearms addressed the applicability of collat-
eral estoppel to subsequent civil proceedings, opponents of Wingate
cannot claim support from the 89 Firearms decision. An acquittal
does not, and should not, immunize a defendant from civil liability.
Concerning further criminal liability, however, the double jeopardy
clause requires that the defendant be regarded as innocent. 47 The
Court's language is not easily extrapolated to the criminal arena. Be-
cause the rights at stake are much more fundamental and precious,
they should not be equated with the monetary liability at issue in civil
actions. ,48
The advocates of the relative burdens of proof rationale settle for a
preponderance standard to be the safeguard of defendants' rights.
Even if the standard were clear and convincing, however, it would be
insufficient to guarantee a fair trial. I4 9 In re Winship'5° requires that
guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet, advocates of the rela-
tive burdens of proof rationale are willing to settle for a preponder-
ance standard because the evidence purportedly does not go to
establish an ultimate fact. In a very real sense, however, testimony
about a non-ultimate fact is testimony about the ultimate facts neces-
sary for a finding of guilt. 15' Allowing highly prejudicial prior
acquittals5 2 to determine a person's fate after passing only a prepon-
derance test is of little comfort. The highly prejudicial nature of ex-
trinsic offenses mandates a much higher standard, " ' especially in view
of the defendant's acquittal of the extrinsic offense.14
147. State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979) ("it is a basic tenet of our jurispru-
dence that... [iln the eyes of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as innocent").
148. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1979).
149. See White, Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts Under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b): Some Unanswered Questions, 21 ATLA L. REP. 117, 120 (1978) ("It should be noted that
'clear and convincing' evidence is not as imposing a standard in practice as it sounds, since even the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice has been held to satisfy that standard.").
150. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
151. See Kaplan, Character Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCE-
DuRE 157 (1985) ("[I]t makes little sense, psychologically, to separate the end product from its
elements .... Testimony does not bear on a single element without bearing on its end product-
the ascription of guilt.").
152. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
153. G. LnrLy, AN INTRODUCTION TO Ta LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.13, at 150 (2d ed. 1987) ("The
telling impact of other-crimes evidence ... coupled with its high potential for inducing prejudice,
justifies some special safeguards."). In fact, some courts have applied a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard to other crimes evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Testa, 548 F.2d 847, 851 n.l (9th Cir.
1977); Ernster v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 422, 424-25, 308 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Crim. App. 1957).
154. The cases which have dealt with the standard of proof for Rule 404(b) evidence have not
had prior acquittals at issue. See Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496 (1988); United States
v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 234-35 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1738 (1988).
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III. THE MODIFIED APPROACH OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
In Oliphant v. Koehler,' the Sixth Circuit ruled that prior acquit-
tals must be excluded only if introduced to prove the same issue a
prior jury rejected. In Oliphant, the defendant was accused of rape.
He had been acquitted in two earlier trials of raping two other
women. In the subsequent trial, the prosecution asserted that the de-
fendant had orchestrated the events surrounding the instant rape. As
in the previous trials, the defendant in the instant trial argued that the
victim had consented to sexual intercourse. Because the issue of or-
chestrating a plan or scheme was not squarely before the prior jury,
the Sixth Circuit admitted the prior acquittal. 56 The court would only
exclude the evidence if the first jury actually ruled on whether the de-
fendant orchestrated the rapes.
The Sixth Circuit draws a false distinction. In Oliphant, the two
prior juries found that the defendant did not rape his accusers. The
orchestration claim in the subsequent trial assumes the defendant
raped his two accusers, otherwise all he orchestrated were seductions.
Although the prior jury did not rule explicitly on the orchestration
claim, the Sixth Circuit distinction is semantic because the jury implic-
itly ruled on the claim. In acquitting the defendant of the prior rapes,
those juries believed the defendant's consent defense and implicitly re-
jected any orchestration theory. The relevancy of the prior acquittal
to the instant case is thus vitiated. Since the defendant did not orches-
trate the prior rapes, the prior acquittals are not relevant to proving
the defendant orchestrated the rape in the instant case. 157
The standard suggested by the Sixth Circuit is inconsistent with pro-
tecting defendants' double jeopardy rights. The "modified approach"
ignores the possibility that a jury's verdict implicitly rejects certain
claims. Moreover, because the evidence of extrinsic offenses is often
introduced in the subsequent trial to establish a different element than
it established in the prior trial, this approach will not exclude many
prior acquittals.'58
155. 594 F.2d 547, 555 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979). See also United States v.
Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming the approach set forth in Oliphant).
156. Oliphant, 594 F.2d at 555.
157. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (arguing Oliphant was wrongly decided).
158. If the Sixth Circuit's modified approach were used by courts which now follow Wingate,
at least three cases would have been decided differently. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d
329 (2d Cir. 1979) (although defendant was acquitted of possession charge, since the instant trial
was for conspiracy to distribute, the first jury did not pass explicitly on the conspiracy claim);
Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975) (although both first and second trial were for
rape, first jury did not expressly pass on orchestration claim); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d
756 (1960) (prior acquittal used at second trial to prove plan or scheme, and first jury could not
have explicitly addressed question of plan or scheme).
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE PROPER ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD FOR
PRIOR ACQUITTED CRIMES
In light of the objections raised by various courts, the admissibility
of evidence relating to crimes of which the defendant was acquitted
should be severely restricted. The proper admissibility standard for
prior acquittals is one which excludes mention of any issue previously
litigated and decided in favor of the defendant. A defendant may in-
voke the doctrine of collateral estoppel as to any ultimate fact the first
jury necessarily decided for the defendant." 9 This absolutist standard
is vital to protect the rights of defendants.160
This standard, as developed in cases like Wingate v. Wainwright,1 61
State v. Wakefield,162 and State v. Perkins,63 does not preclude the
introduction of all prior acquittals. There are situations where some
facts about a previous charge are relevant, where informing the jury
of them would not engender undue prejudice, and where the facts
were not ones which the jury necessarily found in favor of the defen-
dant. Where these requirements are not met, however, the testimony
should not be admitted into evidence.
A. Courts Should Admit Evidence That Does Not Contradict a
Prior Jury's Finding
The admissibility standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit requires
that a judge determine whether the issue the government seeks to
prove was necessarily decided by the previous jury before excluding
the testimony. If the issue was necessarily decided by the prior jury as
an ultimate fact for the defendant, it cannot be relitigated in the in-
159. Collateral estoppel requires a three-step process:
(1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining
whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to
justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide
whether the issue was "litigated" in the first case; and (3) an examination of the record
of the prior proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily decided in the first
case.
United States v. Hemandez, 572 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978).
160. It also has been suggested that collateral estoppel be applied against the defendant in ap-
propriate cases. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and Criminal Prosecutions, 65 IOWA L. REv. 281, 297,
312-19 (1980). For example, a defendant is charged with distributing pornographic materials on
several different days, with each day of distribution accounting for a separate charge, and the
defendant is tried separately for each charge. Professor Vestal suggests that if the materials are
found to be pornographic by the first jury, the defendant should be precluded from contesting this
issue in the subsequent prosecutions provided the materials are identical. Id. at 297.
161. 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
162. 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
163. 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977).
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stant trial.'" Conversely, if the prior jury's basis for acquittal was an
issue other than that which the prosecution is trying to relitigate, col-
lateral estoppel does not apply. 65
The burden of ascertaining what issues the prior jury decided is on
the defendant.'" It is not a rigid burden, however, since the defendant
need not prove there was no other possible issue on which the jury
could have based its verdict. In Ashe v. Swenson, the Court urged
judges not to apply the rule of collateral estoppel "with the hyper-
technical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book.'
167
The Court warned that inquiries into a jury's prior findings 'must be
set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circum-
stances of the proceedings." ' "'  Any more restrictive an application
would amount to a rejection of the rule 69 because only those people
present during jury deliberations will ever know, with absolute cer-
tainty, the basis for the jury's verdict. 70
In practice, this mandate by the Supreme Court has meant that
courts will not examine every possible explanation for the jury's ver-
dict.' 7' Rather, courts look to the reasonable inferences which can be
drawn from the verdict.' 72 To draw these inferences, courts examine
the transcript of the prior trial. 71 Where the trial court neglects to
examine the transcript, an appellate court may remand the case so
that a full transcript of the prior trial will be included in the record. 74
Failure to provide the trial court with a transcript of the prior trial,
however, bars the defendant from raising the issue of collateral estop-
pel on appeal. 75
164. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 212.
165. The issue is "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other
than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." Id. (emphasis added). For
this reason, if the prosecutor nolle prosses a case, collateral estoppel does not apply. Holland v.
State, 466 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1985). However, if a judge grants a motion for judgment of acquittal,
thereby indicating that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the government's case, collateral estoppel should apply.
166. United States v. Hogue, 812 F.2d 1568, 1578 (11 th Cir. 1987).
167. 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
168. Id. (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).
169. Id.
170. United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 333 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979).
171. See Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.) (fact that jury might have exercised pardon
power and returned verdict on lesser charges out of compassion does not allow the state to retry the
issue on which defendant was acquitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
172. See State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 305, 350 P.2d 756, 762 (1960) (courts may look to reason-
able inferences to be drawn from general jury verdicts).
173. See United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 137 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979
(1974); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1971).
174. See United States v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1983).
175. See Smith, 446 F.2d at 202-03; United States v. Friedland, 391 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir.
1968).
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Even if ascertaining the precise reason for the prior jury's verdict is
difficult, 76 the protections of collateral estoppel should not be with-
held. Defendants who can pinpoint the issues decided by the prior
jury should not be denied this protection merely because other defen-
dants are unable to avail themselves of the same shield. Moreover,
courts cited in this Comment generally had little difficulty determining
the basis for the prior verdicts.
B. Acceptable References to Prior Acquitted Crimes
The Wingate rule only excludes evidence offered to prove issues
necessarily decided by the prior jury in favor of the defendant. Evi-
dence associated with a prior acquitted crime will be admissible where
this evidence will not contradict the findings of the prior jury.' 78 A
review of the recognized exceptions to Rule 404(b) will illustrate the
circumstances under which prior acquittals are admissible. These rec-
ognized exceptions fall into four general categories.
1. To Complete the Story
Testimony regarding the context within which the charged crime oc-
curred is admissible if relevant to contested issues in the trial. Such
evidence may be relevant to "complete the story of the crime on trial
by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous
happenings." 79 When the testimony includes criminal acts of which
the defendant was acquitted, however, admissibility and relevance can
be problematic.
In Polk v. State,80 the defendant was charged by separate informa-
tions with grand larceny of an automobile and robbery. Both charges
arose out of the same set of facts. The government alleged that Polk
176. See United States v. Gonzalez, 548 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1977) ("There are many
possible reasons for the jury's verdict and without extrasensory perception, we cannot say that any
one is necessarily inherent in the verdict.").
177. An exception is the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th
Cir. 1983), where the court remanded for the production of a trial transcript. In two other cases,
United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3 (C.M.A.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 95 (1987), and Polk v. State,
252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972), the courts noted that the defendant's collateral estoppel
claim was insufficient because the defendant did not prove what specific facts the prior jury had
necessarily found for the defendant.
178. Prior acquitted crimes are not per se inadmissible under the Wingate rule. Other crimes
evidence offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) is inadmissible only if the relevance of the
extrinsic offense depends on the defendant having committed the prior crime. If the second jury
believes the testimony concerning the prior acts without rejecting the factual fimdings of the first
jury, there is no admissibility problem.
179. MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 558 (3d ed. 1984).
180. 252 Ark. 320, 478 S.W.2d 738 (1972).
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robbed a filling station attendant, locked the attendant and a cus-
tomer in a rest room, and left the scene by stealing the customer's
car.' 8 ' Polk was first tried and acquitted on the robbery charge. Subse-
quently, he was tried and convicted on the grand larceny charge. At
the grand larceny trial, the government's witnesses testified that Polk
robbed the station and fled in a customer's car, even though Polk had
been acquitted of the robbery charge.'12 The Arkansas Supreme Court
held that the prior acquittal was properly admitted since Polk had
failed to show on what basis the jury had acquitted him.'83
This type of testimony generally is inadmissible under the Wingate
rule. To decide what prior acquitted acts witnesses may testify about,
the judge must determine first what ultimate facts the prior jury nec-
essarily decided. If Polk denied being at the filling station at the time
in question, and the prior jury had to find that Polk was not present
to acquit him, then the testimony about his presence at the station
would be inadmissible in the second trial because that fact was already
litigated. 84 If, on the other hand, Polk admitted to being at the sta-
tion but denied robbing the attendant, then the government witnesses
would be permitted to testify only as to his presence. Since the prior
jury would have found that Polk did not commit the robbery, under
no circumstances should any witness be permitted to testify that Polk
committed the prior robbery. 181
2. To Prove Scheme or Plan
Evidence of an extrinsic offense which shows the defendant was
carrying out a scheme or plan is probative of the defendant's guilt
because if the defendant committed the other acts which are part of a
181. Id. at 321, 478 S.W.2d at 739.
182. Id. at 323, 478 S.W.2d at 740.
183. Id. at 322, 478 S.W.2d at 739. Such a showing is crucial. See supra notes 166-75 and
accompanying text.
184. Contra King v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979). In
King, the government was allowed to "impeach the defendant's voluntary testimony consisting of a
continuous narrative covering a large part of two days," id. at 441, by introducing evidence that
the defendant robbed a different laundry the day before the instant crime even though the defen-
dant was acquitted of robbing the first laundry in a prior trial. The ability of the government to
impeach the defendant's story is questionable. The prior verdict does not necessarily mean the jury
found that the defendant was not in that laundry that day. However, it does necessarily mean that
the government cannot relitigate the issue of whether the defendant robbed the other laundry. Un-
less the prior jury had to find that the defendant was not in the first laundry when it was robbed,
the government could introduce witnesses to place the defendant at the other laundry, thus proving
the defendant lied about his whereabouts. Collateral estoppel is not violated so long as the defen-
dant is not accused of robbing the other laundry.
185. For an example of how testimony may be limited to facts not collaterally estopped by a
defendant's prior acquittal, see infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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scheme or plan which includes the instant crime, then the defendant is
probably guilty. 186 However, if the prior act which constitutes part of
the overall scheme is a crime of which the defendant was acquitted,
then the extrinsic offense generally is inadmissible. 18 7
In Oliphant v. Koehler,'88 the defendant was charged with rape. Al-
though he admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim, he
maintained that she had consented. The government subpoenaed two
women who claimed the defendant raped them after following a
course of action similar to the one used in the instant rape. The gov-
ernment introduced the testimony of the two women to prove that the
defendant had a scheme or plan to orchestrate the events leading up to
the intercourse to make it appear as if his victims consented to the
intercourse. 8 9 The defendant had already been tried and acquitted of
raping the two witnesses, whom the defendant also asserted had con-
sented to intercourse.
The Sixth Circuit refused to apply collateral estoppel to the issue of
whether the defendant had raped the two witnesses. The court held
that unless the prior juries had considered the claims of orchestration,
there was no relitigation of issues already decided. The court ruled
that the prior juries could have found the defendant orchestrated the
events surrounding the intercourse, but that the victim ultimately con-
sented to his advances.
186. MCCORMICK oN EVIDENCE § 190, at 559 (3d ed. 1984) ("Itlo prove the existence of a larger
plan, scheme, or conspiracy of which the crime on trial is a pan").
187. An exception to this general rule can be found in United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3234 (1987). In Davis, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to distribute illegal narcotics. To satisfy the overt act requirement of the conspiracy
charge, the government introduced a prior charge of illegal narcotics distribution. The defendant
had been acquitted of the prior charge due to entrapment. The Sixth Circuit admitted the testimony
because the defendant's invocation of the entrapment defense meant he admitted committing the
act of distributing narcotics. Since the overt act in a conspiracy case need not be illegal, id. at 1206,
the government's use of the prior acquittal did not contradict the prior jury's findings. The prior
jury found that the defendant distributed narcotics. The government used that act, without refer-
ence to criminal intent, to establish a conspiracy. There was no violation of double jeopardy be-
cause the defendant was not required to reestablish his innocence, since it was never questioned. Id.
188. 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979).
189. This orchestration consisted of getting the victims into the car voluntarily under the pre-
tense of taking them to their destination. Using different excuses, all victims were instead taken to
unfamiliar areas of town. Although the victims had opportunities to escape, they did not because
the defendant acted so friendly. Once the defendant became violent, there was no longer any op-
portunity for escape. The victims were all told to submit or they would be injured in some way.
None of the victims were beaten, nor were any of their clothes torn. The victims were then driven
home. The defendant gave one victim his college identification card, and encouraged another to
take down his tag number. Thus, the victims went to the police station alleging rape against a man
they apparently knew. "Knowledge of defendant's name, address, college identification and car
license numbers, along with other facts such as the lack of bruises and apparent opportunities to
escape would tend to lessen the women's credibility when they told their story of rape." Id. at 552.
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The Sixth Circuit misapplied the Ashe rule. The court hypothesized
what the jury could have found. Such hypothesizing violates the Su-
preme Court's edict against applying hypertechnical rules to collateral
estoppel.19° What the prior juries did find was that the defendant's
alleged victims had consented to intercourse. The only possible rele-
vance of the prior alleged rapes would be to show that the defendant
had a scheme by which he raped women. However, to prove such a
scheme the government must prove the defendant actually raped the
two witnesses. Since the defendant was acquitted of both charges, the
two alleged rapes were irrelevant to the instant charge' 9' unless orches-
tration of consensual sex diminishes the defense of consent to the in-
stant charge. Orchestration of consensual intercourse (seduction) is
not a crime; only unconsensual intercourse is a crime. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit allowed the claim of orchestrating rapes to be established by
acts which were deemed not to have been rapes, and forced the defen-
dant to again prove that the two witnesses consented to having sex
with him.
3. To Prove Identity
There are several ways in which the identity of a defendant as a
perpetrator can be established through evidence of extrinsic offenses.
The identity of the defendant as perpetrator can be shown by (1) prov-
ing "other crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to
earmark them as the handiwork of the accused;"' 92 (2) establishing
that the defendant has a propensity for the same unusual sexual rela-
tions which the perpetrator in the instant case displayed; 193 (3) proving
the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime; 94 or (4) prov-
ing the defendant had a motive for committing the crime. 95 However,
if the defendant was acquitted of the prior offense and relevance de-
pends on the present jury's belief that the defendant committed the
prior offense, the prior acquittal is inadmissible.196
190. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
192. McCoRhucK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 559 (3d ed. 1984) (footnote omitted). This exception is
also known as moduss operandi or the signature exception.
193. Id. at 560.
194. Id. at 563 ("in the sense of access to or presence at the scene of the crime or in the sense
of possessing distinctive or unusual skills or abilities employed in the commission of the crime
charged") (footnotes omitted).
195. Id. at 562.
196. See Blackburn v. Cross, 510 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor collaterally estopped
from presenting evidence that defendant attacked two other women in apartment complex because
defendant was acquitted). See also supra note 127 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why
Blackburn was correctly decided, see supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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Evidence of modus operandi almost always should be inadmissible
because its only purpose is to prove the defendant has committed a
nearly identical act in the past and, therefore, probably committed the
instant crime. Once the defendant is acquitted of the prior act, no
modus operandi has been established. In United States v. Dowling, 97
the defendant was convicted of several offenses arising from a bank
robbery. 98 At trial, the government called a witness who testified that
two weeks after the bank robbery at issue, she was robbed by a man
"wearing a knitted mask with cut out eyes (of a different color than
the one worn by the bank robber) and carrying a small handgun
(which was similar to the black silvery gun used in the bank rob-
bery)." 9 Although the defendant already had been tried and acquit-
ted of attempted robbery of the witness, the trial court admitted the
testimony to show identity.200 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that since the prior jury necessarily decided that the defendant
did not participate in the prior attempted robbery, "the constitutional
doctrine of collateral estoppel included in the Fifth Amendment's
double jeopardy clause" 20' precluded the government from introduc-
ing the prior acquitted crime in the instant trial. 202
Propensity for unusual sexual relations is indicative of identity on
the same theory as modus operandi. If the prior crime is an indication
of the defendant's sexual proclivities, the testimony is highly relevant.
If the unusual sexual relations occurred during the commission of a
crime of which the defendant was acquitted, however, testimony
about the defendant's sexual desires may be inadmissible. 23
197. 855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989).
198. Id. at 116.
199. Id. at 120.
200. Id. at 120-21.
201. Id. at 120.
202. Id. at 120-22. The court also would have ruled the evidence inadmissible on other grounds.
See id. at 122 (prior acquittal inadmissible under Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496
(1988), since prior jury's determination that defendant did not commit prior crime means that
subsequent jury cannot reasonably conclude that the prior rime was committed by the defendant);
id. (trial court's failure to exclude evidence under Rule 403 was an abuse of discretion).
The court affirmed the defendant's conviction, however, because it concluded that the admission
of the prior acquitted crime was harmless error. Id. at 122-24. In Dowling, the Supreme Court
could limit or expand the scope of the harmless error doctrine articulated in Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). However, the application of the harmless error doctrine to the introduction
of prior acquitted crimes will not be addressed in this Comment.
203. A witness certainly could not testify about illegal sexual acts, such as sodomy, for which
the defendant was tried and acquitted. Since consent is not a defense to such crimes, an acquittal
means the defendant did not commit the act as defined by law. To use the prior charge of sodomy
to prove the defendant enjoys sodomy would violate double jeopardy, because the defendant would
have to reestablish that he did not commit the prior act.
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In Felker v. State,204 the defendant was charged with rape and sod-
omy. Evidence of an extrinsic offense was introduced to prove iden-
tity.205 In the prior case, the defendant was convicted of aggravated
sodomy, but was acquitted of rape. The court ruled that the convic-
tion on the sodomy charge was proof that the prior jury believed the
defendant was present when the victim was abused. The court then
reasoned that although the prior jury believed the defendant's consent
defense to the rape charge, it did not necessarily find that he did not
commit all the acts of which he was accused. Thus, the court admit-
ted the extrinsic offense to establish identity.
The court's approach in Felker demonstrates the proper application
of the Wingate rule. In Felker, the government offered the extrinsic
offense to show that the defendant had a propensity for unusual sex-
ual relations. The defendant's prior acquittal based on a consent de-
fense did not negate his participation in these unusual sexual relations.
Thus, the court properly permitted the victim of the prior crime to
testify that the defendant had participated in unusual sexual relations
with her, without testifying that the relations were nonconsensual.
Any testimony by the prior victim that she did not consent to sexual
relations with the defendant, however, would be inadmissible because
the prior jury found for the defendant on the consent issue. Although
the jury may believe the prior victim consented to the defendant's ac-
tions, this is not very prejudicial to the state. For example, if a defen-
dant's wife were to testify about the defendant's penchant for
sodomy, her consent to his actions would not diminish a victim's
claim of rape and sodomy. In other words, it is unlikely that a jury
would believe that because the defendant's prior partner may have
consented to his wishes, every woman he has sexual relations with
thereafter will be presumed to have similarly consented. Limiting the
testimony of a witness to issues which the prior jury did not necessar-
ily decide is a legitimate way to protect the interests of the government
and the defendant.
In Jackson v. State,20 7 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a
trial court's admission of evidence relating to a prior crime of which
the defendant was acquitted. The defendant was charged with first-
204. 252 Ga. App. 351, 314 S.E.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
205. The government offered evidence to show that in both the previous case and the instant
case, the defendant bound the victims' ankles and wrists, covered their eyes and mouths with tape,
bruised their breasts and right thighs, choked them, ripped their underwear, sexually abused them,
and removed each of their necklaces while leaving their pendants in their purses. Id. at 360-61, 314
S.E.2d at 632.
206. Id. at 362, 314 S.E.2d at 633.
207. 498 So. 2d 406 (Fla.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3241 (1987).
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degree murder of a police officer. 2° When the police officer placed
the defendant in the police car, the defendant shot the officer with a
gun that the defendant apparently had hidden. The defendant then
ran from the area and eventually caught a taxicab. While the defen-
dant was in the cab, the driver discovered the gun and struggled to
take it away from the defendant, eventually throwing it out of the
cab. Allegedly, the defendant retrieved the gun and shot at the cab
driver through the cab's rear window.209 Prior to being tried for shoot-
ing the police officer, the defendant was tried and acquitted of the
attempted murder of the cab driver. 210
The cab driver was allowed to testify at the subsequent trial that the
defendant had been in his cab on the day of the police officer's mur-
der, that they struggled for a gun, and that the cab driver threw the
gun out the window. 21' "No testimony was allowed concerning the al-
leged shooting or concerning the facts of the alleged crime of which
appellant was acquitted. ' 21 2 This limitation on the cab driver's testi-
mony illustrates the proper application of the Wingate rule since the
cab driver was not allowed to testify about any facts which the prior
jury found in favor of the defendant.
Another way to establish a defendant's identity is to prove the de-
fendant's opportunity to commit the crime. 213 Opportunity can be es-
tablished through reference to a prior criminal act. If the defendant
was acquitted of the prior act, however, admissibility is questionable.
Such testimony is inadmissible if the jury must relitigate the issue of
guilt in the prior crime for the prior act to become relevant. 214
For example, 21 1 suppose a defendant is charged with forging en-
dorsements on checks stolen from YMCA mailboxes. Since the defen-
dant's name does not appear anywhere on the checks, the government
attempts to convince the jury that the defendant was the forger of the
checks at issue by proving that the defendant had the opportunity to
seize the checks. To prove that the defendant had access to the YMCA
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id. at409.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 409-10.
212. Idat 410.
213. Since this exception relies on proving opportunity through presence at the scene of the
crime, or through demonstrating any special abilities of the defendant, it is similar to the "complete
the story" exception and the signature exception. See supra notes 179, 192 and accompanying text.
214. Another reason for excluding the testimony would be that the same point can be estab-
lished with different, less prejudicial, evidence. McCoRMICK ON EVDENCE § 190, at 565 (3d ed.
1984).
215. This example is drawn from the facts of United States v. DeJohn, 638 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir.
1981), where the defendant's prior acts were uncharged.
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mailboxes, the government calls two witness, a YMCA security guard
and a city police officer. The two witnesses testify that the defendant
previously had been apprehended for stealing mail from YMCA mail-
boxes, although the defendant previously had been acquitted of that
charge. Such evidence is relevant and admissible. The admissibility of
the prior acquittal would depend on the grounds for the acquittal and
on what facts the prior jury found in the defendant's favor.
If the defendant's sole defense in the prior case was that the two
officers were mistaken, then the prior jury would have necessarily de-
cided that the defendant did not remove mail from the YMCA mail-
boxes. The testimony of the two officers in the subsequent case,
therefore, would be inadmissible because the prior jury would have
rejected their story.: To reintroduce their testimony would force the
defendant to again prove his innocence of the prior crime.
On the other hand, if the defendant's defense in the prior case was
that he did not actually remove any of the contents from the mail-
boxes because he changed his mind after opening the boxes, evidence
of the prior crime would be admissible. In this situation, the prior
jury would not necessarily have found that the defendant did not en-
ter the mailboxes. The jury could have accepted the defendant's testi-
mony that he did not steal any mail, and also accepted the
government's testimony that he did open the boxes. Thus, the instant
jury could find that because the defendant had access to the mail-
boxes, he had the opportunity to commit the crime in the instant case.
Such a jury finding would not contradict the prior jury's finding.
Proving the defendant had a motive for committing the crime is
also probative of the defendant's identity.116 The admissibility of testi-
mony regarding motive will depend on whether the motive stems from
a crime of which the defendant was acquitted. In State v. Paradis,21 7
the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the murder of
Kimberly Palmer after previously having been acquitted of murdering
Palmer's fiance. The defendant allegedly had murdered Palmer's fi-
anc6 and then murdered Palmer. Testimony regarding the killing of
Palmer's fianc6 was admitted to prove that the defendant had a mo-
tive to kill Palmer-to prevent her from identifying her fiance's mur-
derer .2 1
Although the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation of Ashe v. Swenson,2 9 it nevertheless applied the Wingate
216. MCCO MCK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 562 (3d ed. 1984).
217. 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984).
218. Id. at 122, 676 P.2d at 36.
219. Id. at 122-23, 676 P.2d at 36-37.
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rule appropriately. The court noted that the basis for the prior jury's
acquittal did not necessarily require the jury to find that the defendant
was not present during the murder of Palmer's fiance. 220 Since the de-
fendant could have believed that Palmer would identify the defendant
as one of her fiance's killers, testimony regarding her fiance's murder
was admissible despite the fact that the defendant previously had been
acquitted of murdering Palmer's fiance. There is no contradiction of
the prior jury's verdict, because the second jury could still accept the
defendant's innocence of Palmer's fiance's murder while still finding
he had a motive to kill Palmer.
4. To Show Intent
In crimes where intent is a necessary element for conviction, extrin-
sic offenses may be admissible under Rule 404(b) as proof of intent.12 1
However, where the defendant is acquitted of the extrinsic offense,
evidence of the prior acquittal is not always relevant to prove intent to
commit the instant crime. As always, admissibility hinges on the na-
ture of the defendant's defense in the prior trial. Assume the defen-
dant is indicted on two counts of murder. The defendant is accused of
breaking into victim A 's house and shooting victim A while scream-
ing, "I am going to kill you." The defendant shot victim A three
times, but one bullet missed and hit victim B, killing B instantly. Un-
beknownst to the defendant, however, victim A had been killed by
victim B moments before the defendant broke into the house. At the
trial for victim A's murder, the defendant is acquitted under the doc-
trine of impossibility. 2 2 At a separate trial for the murder of victim B,
testimony concerning the shooting of victim A, and the statements
made by the defendant during the shooting of victim A, would be ad-
missible to show the defendant's intent because the prior jury did not
necessarily find that the defendant lacked the requisite intent. Rather,
the jury most likely determined that the defendant possessed the nec-
essary intent, but acquitted him under the doctrine of impossibility.
In United States v. Van Cleave,223 the defendant was charged with
stealing a truck, repainting and restamping it, and with knowingly
transporting the truck across state lines. The government introduced
evidence concerning a prior truck, which the defendant allegedly had
220. Id. at 123, 676 P.2d at 37.
221. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 563 (3d ed. 1984) ("[t]o show, without considering
motive, that defendant acted with malice, deliberation, or the requisite specific intent").
222. See A. DERsHowTrz, TmE BEsT DEFENSE 85-116 (1982) (details case where defendant was
charged with murder, and later attempted murder, for shooting a corpse).
223. 599 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1979).
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previously helped steal, repaint and restamp, in order to "show mo-
tive, preparation, plan, intent and knowledge, and absence of mis-
take. ' ' 2 4 Although the defendant was acquitted of the earlier offense,
the Eighth Circuit in the instant case affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion to admit the testimony concerning the prior acquittal.
The testimony should have been excluded under the Wingate rule.
For the instant jury to infer the defendant's intent based on the extrin-
sic offense, it would have to believe that the defendant committed the
prior charged crime. Since that was an issue which the prior jury
found in the defendant's favor, the defendant should not be required
to again prove his innocence. 225
In criminal cases, the government often establishes the defendant's
intent by proving the crime was not committed by accident or mis-
take. A prior offense is relevant to disprove accident or mistake.22 6
Under this exception to Rule 404(b), even a prior acquittal may be
relevant 227 and not unduly prejudicial.22 1 Prior acquittals are relevant
to rebut the defense of mistake because they demonstrate that the de-
fendant was on notice that certain behavior is illegal.229 In United
224. Id. at 957.
225. See United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1980) (evidence concerning prior charge
of distribution of methamphetamines not admissible to show that defendant had the intent to dis-
tribute in the instant offense because the defendant was acquitted of the prior charge based on
entrapment).
226. McCocMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 561 (3d ed. 1984) ("[t]o show, by similar acts or
incidents, that the act in question was not performed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or
without guilty knowledge").
The more similar the recurring events, the more likely it is that intent was present.
Inadvertence would be an unusual and abnormal element which might perhaps be pres-
ent in one instance, but the oftener similar instances occur with similar results the less
likely is the abnormal element the true explanation of them. In short, since similar re-
sults do not usually occur through abnormal causes, the recurrence of similar results
tends to negative accident or inadvertence or other innocent mental state, and to estab-
lish criminal intent.
State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 511, 219 P. 1106, 1108 (1923) (citation omitted).
227. This exception to the Wingate rule has one strict requirement-the defendant must actu-
ally assert the defense of mistake or accident at the second trial. United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d
570, 575 (2d. Cir. 1965). A good example of the proper use of prior acquittals under this exception
to Rule 404(b) is United States v. Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973).
228. Of course, prejudice depends on how the testimony is elicited. Under this exception, ex-
trinsic offenses need not be proved in a way which unduly prejudices the defendant. Rather than
calling witnesses to testify about the defendant's prior bad acts, the defense should stipulate to the
prior indictment and trial. The jury should be told that the defendant was acquitted. The judge
should stress that the defendant was not guilty of the prior crime, but that because the prior charge
placed the defendant on notice about the potential illegality of the activities for which charges have
been brought, the jury may infer criminal intent.
229. "[Pjroof that the defendant was aware of the nature of an act at an earlier point in time
makes it unlikely that he would have forgotten that information at the time of the charged crime."
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States v. Rocha,230 the defendant was convicted of possession of mar-
ijuana with intent to distribute. A search of the defendant's van had
uncovered 231 pounds of marijuana. 231 On a previous charge of trans-
porting marijuana, the defendant was acquitted after he claimed that
he thought he was transporting furniture. 2 2 At the instant trial, the
government introduced evidence concerning the prior charge to
counter the defendant's mistake defense. 233 The court properly admit-
ted the prior acquittal as relevant to the defendant's intent, 2 4 since the
prior charge put the defendant on notice not to transport strange
packages without first inspecting them. The second jury could rely on
the prior charge to reject the defendant's claim of mistake in the in-
stant case without contradicting the prior jury's acquittal.
Evidence concerning a prior crime of which the defendant was ac-
quitted based on the defense of accident is relevant to rebut the asser-
tion of the defense of accident in a subsequent trial because it reduces
the statistical probability of another accident occurring. 235 Where a
prior jury has not found that an accident occurred, however, that
prior acquitted crime would not serve to reduce the statistical proba-
bility of another accident occurring.
Commentators have criticized the Wingate approach to the accident
defense, contending that it impedes the conviction of defendants who
commit multiple similar crimes236 and are acquitted of each case sepa-
rately. This criticism is unfounded because applying the Wingate ap-
proach in this context will not necessarily require that the prior
acquittal or acquittals be declared inadmissible. For example, 237 a ba-
bysitter is charged with the murder of a child under her care. Al-
though the government has no direct physical evidence of foul play,
the defendant also has had five other children mysteriously die at vari-
22 C. WIGHr & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5247, at 518 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
230. 553 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1977).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 615-16.
233. See id. at 616.
234. Id.
235. Thus, the analysis for determining the relevance of a prior acquittal to rebut the defense of
accident differs somewhat from the analysis for determining the relevance of a prior acquittal to
rebut the defense of mistake. Whereas a prior acquittal may be relevant to rebut the defense of
mistake in the second trial regardless of whether the defendant asserted the defense of mistake in
the first trial, a prior acquittal offered to counter the defense of accident in a subsequent trial will
only be relevant if the defendant successfully asserted the defense of accident in the prior trial.
236. See, e.g., G. LELLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.13, at 152 (2d ed.
1987).
237. The facts of this example are loosely drawn from United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1973).
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ous times while under her care. Since these prior deaths occurred sepa-
rately, however, the defendant was tried for one death at a time and
was acquitted of each based on an accident defense. Although the
government cannot pronounce the defendant guilty in the instant case
on the basis of the prior accidents, there is a middle ground. Instead
of questioning the jury's factual findings underlying the prior verdict,
the government can agree with its result, but question the probability
of the accident repeating itself in the instant case.
[T]he absence of mistake or accident is proved on a notion of
probability; i.e., how likely is it that the defendant would have made
the same mistake or have been involved in the same fortuitous act on
more than one occasion. The relevance of other crimes for this
purpose depends very much on the nature of the act involved; one
might inadvertently pass more than one counterfeit bill but two
accidental shootings of the same victim seem quite unlikely. 238
The government can introduce testimony showing that the defendant
has previously asserted the defense of accident when charged with a
similar crime. The second jury may then, without relitigating the prior
jury's verdict, determine the probability of the same accident occur-
ring more than once.
V. CONCLUSION
Admitting evidence to prove an issue previously litigated and neces-
sarily decided for the defendant in a prior prosecution is an affront to
the underlying philosophy of our criminal justice system. Admission
of such evidence violates the double jeopardy clause, the due process
clause, and the relevancy requirement of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. By admitting evidence of prior acquittals when the evidence
does not contradict the prior jury's findings, the minority view accom-
plishes the goal of balancing a defendant's rights against society's in-
terest in convicting wrongdoers with all relevant evidence.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Dowling2 9 will soon address
the admissibility of prior acquittals under Rule 404(b). Although the
Court could follow the majority rule and give credence to the relative
burdens of proof rationale, it should resist doing so. Instead, by ex-
tending Ashe v. Swenson24° down the path the Fifth Circuit paved in
238. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAm, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5247, at 518 (1978)
(footnotes omitted).
239. 855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989).
240. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
PRIOR ACQUITTED CRIMES
Wingate v. Wain wright,241 the Court could help preserve the impor-
tant safeguards our judicial system provides defendants. As Judge Irv-
ing Kaufman observed in United States v. Mespoulede:242
Allowing a second jury to reconsider the very issue upon which the
defendant has prevailed serves no valuable function. To the
contrary, it implicates concerns about the injustice of exposing a
defendant to repeated risks of conviction for the same conduct, and
to the ordeal of multiple trials, that lie at the heart of the double
jeopardy clause. 243
Regardless of the Court's decision, critics will abound. If the Court
must err, better that it err on the side of stronger fifth amendment
protection from overzealous prosecutors and jurors incapable of heed-
ing limiting instructions, than err by allowing highly prejudicial evi-
dence to taint our criminal justice system.
241. 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
242. 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979).
243. Id. at 337 (citation omitted).
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